Plenty of Lemons

This is Episode 22 in the story of the formation, rise and fall of the little education collective that used to exist up here on our mountain. I wrote and posted this account three years ago on my blog and then pulled it off because someone whose name I had not changed, objected. Now I have changed both the name of the little school itself, and the names of everyone who might be negatively impacted, and plan to re-post the story, one episode per day, until all 32 are again on my blog.

Plenty of Lemons

I began this narrative on the fall of the Bell Springs Education Collective with the intent of showing the path that led both to our school folding, and to my getting my teaching credential. The two are interwoven so that one-half of the story cannot be adequateIy told in exclusion from the other half. I chose to follow the chain of litigation through to its conclusion before continuing the tale from the perspective of the school itself.

We tried to keep focused on Bell Springs as we journeyed along this most treacherous path, filled with legal obstacles provided by Imika. The kids certainly knew what was up. They knew Imika was mad about Misha being asked to leave the Collective, but they did not know why she was mad at them. The last full regular year at the little school was ’88-’89, so the beginning of the end took place in September of 1988, when Karen made the decision to terminate her contract-teaching status with Misha.

As I stated earlier, this was the single most pivoting event and I feel it is critical to understand Karen’s perspective. As an educator, she had to weigh all factors involved in the situation. If a child were involved in the public school system in town, then the teacher in charge of the class would have expectations which focused on assessment and evaluation of student-expected skills.  

In Karen’s case, and later on in my own situation, the contract teacher for Bell Springs had to be able to determine the rate of a student’s learning in a similar manner, only there were those two days per week that were taking place in the individual homes of students to account for.  There had to be measurable progress from those additional days for Karen to see growth. Failure to do so, would cast a shadow over the integrity of the Collective, and subsequently over the integrity of the contract teacher.

Karen simply took her own personal knowledge of Imika, having been her closest neighbor since the time that Misha was born, and determined that there was too much at risk, based on her own observations, and on those of Misha’s tutors and the parent teachers with whom Misha worked, to ignore her lack of forward progress. It all added up to Karen taking the only stance she could, both in her own interests and those of the Collective.   

 

Here are the more salient points from the letter that Karen wrote to Imika, upon reaching her decision, not to continue as Misha’s contract teacher:

“Dear Imika,

This is an official letter to let you know that Misha’s educational situation is not working out in her best interests.  As it is set up, I am the official contract teacher from the Laytonville Unified School District who sets up assignments for her and monitors her progress.  She has a tutorial teacher, who works with her and other children her age, to help them learn three days a week.  However, most of her learning must be carried out and supported at home.  This is a home education situation and she is not making adequate academic progress due to a lack of help at home.

I was not her contract teacher last year, but I do have access to letters you were given from her tutors last year.  In her February evaluation of 1988, Deb wrote that Misha was making some progress with blending sounds but still did not know the entire alphabet and had trouble concentrating on anything for more than ten minutes.  According to her tutor this semester, September, 1988, this is still true.  She still does not know the alphabet letters and sounds consistently.  Misha is so distracted and upset she cannot remember what she has learned (e.g. letters r and w) for even a few minutes. Misha is extremely disruptive in her small tutoring group...

...This year Misha is consistently either late or extremely early coming for her tutoring, which has been a pattern in the past.  Rhythm in her home schedule is lacking concerning her homework as well.  It cannot all be crammed in at the last minute...

Both the tutors and I feel that Misha would benefit more from some other educational plan, which does not depend so heavily on homework and home learning...  I would like to recommend that you seriously consider regular public school so that Misha has a solid daily routine in her life and plenty of chances to develop her social skills...I have informed Mr. Richard M that Misha will not be involved in this contract program.”

Sincerely,

Karen”

It was not an easy decision to make for Karen, because she knew it ultimately would mean that Misha would have to leave the collective. No other contract teacher would care to step into the situation, and go against Karen’s professional opinion. However, after examining the memo, dated November of 1987, Karen felt there was no alternative. 

Of course, she had to be objective; that goes without saying. However, to make observations, and then to consult with the current teachers, and have your observations confirmed by earlier notes, lent credibility to the course of action that she took.  I do not know of anyone in the collective who ever felt that Karen had any other choice in the matter.  Our biggest decision, at this point in time, was to decide whether the Collective was in a position to continue its affiliation with the District, with its infusion of money and expertise, or to forge ahead on its own.  

That is where my journey with the process of obtaining my California Teaching Credential began.  Coincidentally, the act of my applying to Dominican College, prompted Imika to write the infamous letter to Susan Rounds, the Director of Dominican, which opened my door into those hallways down at the court house in Ukiah.  By the time I finished my year at Dominican, I had become pretty familiar with Ukiah, when you consider that I was attending college full-time, consulting with Barry Vogel, and spending quality time with those nice judges.  

Besides, having all of that reading from Dominican, gave me something to do while waiting around at the other two venues, so it all worked out just fine, if you were bound and determined to make lemonade out of lemons.  Well, we had plenty of lemons with which to work, the only problem being a shortage of available sugar, to make the experience palatable.

The Fat Lady Sings

This is Episode 21 in the story of the formation, rise and fall of the little education collective that used to exist up here on our mountain. I wrote and posted this account three years ago on my blog and then pulled it off because someone whose name I had not changed, objected. Now I have changed both the name of the little school itself, and the names of everyone who might be negatively impacted, and plan to re-post the story, one episode per day, until all 32 are again on my blog.

The Fat Lady Sings

All court cases were completed, and having heard Superintendent Linda-T-J’s sworn statement, we can officially say that the fat lady has sung, so the only thing left was to record Judge Susan Illston’s decision as regards the plaintiffs’ free speech complaint.  

This is what she wrote: “To establish a claim for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the plaintiffs must show that Corrine’s speech was protected by the first Amendment [Several cases have held that in order to obtain first amendment protection, speech must pertain to a matter of public concern.] and that this speech was a substantial or motivating factor for the defendants’ actions.  

In particular, if the Chintzes can establish that a deprivation of Misha’s public educational opportunities was due to Corrine’s exercise of constitutionally protected rights of criticism, they are entitled to relief under Section 1983.

The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the defendants deprived Misha of equal education opportunities in retaliation for Corrine’s speech.  The evidence is undisputed that none of the defendants excluded Misha from the contract teaching program.  Misha was assigned a new contract teacher after Karen decided not to continue as Misha’s instructor. 

The evidence is also undisputed that Misha met with contract instructors Lynn and Liz in Laytonville and not in the Bell Springs area pursuant to a school district policy permitting the contract teacher and student to decide jointly where the meetings would take place.

The evidence also shows that Liz was restricted to teaching eighth through twelfth grade students because she was overburdened and that Misha was offered a place on the waiting list that had been established for students also seeking contract instructors.

Finally, the plaintiffs have provided no admissible evidence in support of their allegations that defendant Linda T-J advised the plaintiffs that Misha could not be re-enrolled in the school district because of the Chintzes‘ ongoing lawsuit against school district defendants.  

The Court therefore grants summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs on the plaintiffs‘ free speech claim.

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby grants summary judgment in favor of defendants Karen, O’Neill, Mark I, Richard M, Brian B, Linda T.J,  Suzanne, Dan K, Lynn, and Bill W and against plaintiffs Misha and Corrine Chintz.

It is so ordered.

March 17, 1997

Susan Illston

United States District Judge

I felt like Bilbo, upon his return from the adventure with Smaug the Dragon. This whole preposterous legal entanglement was history. The judge had explained the reasoning and the plaintiffs were told they had lost. Earlier, when I had summarized the series of decisions, leading up to the final March 17, 1997 decree, there were six different court dates, each of them representing court appearances, along the path to the final judgment.  From 1992 through 1997, only 1994 escaped having a court date decide some issue.  

As a community we continued to defend ourselves against Imika’s claims.  As frustrated as we were, both individually and as a group, we still kept our focus and took the necessary steps to defend ourselves. Those of us who remember sitting down in the courthouse or in Barry’s office, know that it was no joke. Others may have thought the whole thing was blown out of proportion, but staring down the barrel of some hired gun out of Eureka, knowing that the ante was five million clams, was enough to keep any of us from thinking anything was blown out of proportion. I never feared that we were in the wrong; however, I did worry whether or not a United States District Judge would see it the same way.

After all that time, money, energy and angst, what did we learn from the experience? We learned that one person can twist the legal path to suit individual needs and then others have to respond accordingly.  We also learned that we could count on one another to bolster each other and that if we continued to pay Barry, he would set things straight. We learned that bad stuff happens in the judicial system, but that good would prevail.

We learned that it costs to play the game, and that in unity there is strength. We had flexed our community muscles because we had to, not because we wanted to and the result was that justice had prevailed. These events took place more than thirty years ago now, but the lessons learned will remain for many years to come, as part of the foundation upon which our mountain community is built.

Our foundation is earthquake-proof.

Judgment for the Defendants

This is Episode 20 in the story of the formation, rise and fall of the little education collective that used to exist up here on our mountain. I wrote and posted this account three years ago on my blog and then pulled it off because someone whose name I had not changed, objected. Now I have changed both the name of the little school itself, and the names of everyone who might be negatively impacted, and plan to re-post the story, one episode per day, until all 32 are again on my blog.

Judgment for the Defendants

Before I extricate myself from that legal hook, I think it important to note that Imika claimed that the district deprived Misha of equal educational opportunities.  As we examine the three contract teachers who served as Misha’s contract teacher, we see that Imika was responsible for severing ties with all three.

By not fulfilling parental responsibilities, Imika forced Karen into having to relinquish Karen’s contract teacher status. Strike one. By becoming disenchanted with Lynn because she did not like Lynn’s testimony, and subsequently asking for a new contract teacher, Imika gave up her second opportunity. Strike two. And finally, she complained that Liz was not able to give Misha as much time as she thought was needed, and Liz was reassigned to the high school. Strike three.

Meanwhile, Judge Susan had ruled that Karen had not been responsible for any public deprivation of rights, so it was my turn.

The plaintiffs made essentially the same allegations with respect to me.

“First, the plaintiffs contend that O’Neill refused to teach Misha when he became a contract teacher in the Fall of 1989. The plaintiffs offer as evidence his statement that he had no interest in teaching students who were not part of the Collective. However, the evidence is undisputed that (1) at the time O’Neill became a contract teacher, Misha already had a contract teacher, Lynn, and (2) he was never asked to take on Misha as one of his contract students.  

Moreover, during the period that O’Neill was employed as a contract teacher, a mutual restraining order was in effect between Corrine and him, which she had violated on four separate occasions.  Under any circumstances, his decision not to volunteer as Misha’s contract instructor, did not deprive Misha of equal public educational opportunities.

Imika also alleged that O’Neill participated in the expelling of Misha from the Bell Springs Collective program.  The evidence is undisputed that he was not hired as a contract teacher, until almost a year after Misha’s alleged exclusion from the Collective. Because O’Neill was a private citizen at the time of the exclusion, he could not have acted in an official capacity to exclude Misha from the Bell Springs program, which was in any event, a privately run program. The plaintiffs’ arguments with respect to plaintiff O’Neill are clearly without merit.”

As far as defendant Mark I. was concerned, Judge Susan went on to find that the plaintiffs’ claims that they had been deprived of their rights was false, because no evidence could be found that Misha was treated any differently than any other contract student, during his time as Interim Superintendent.

“The plaintiffs made several allegations concerning Principal Richard M and Superintendent Brian B: (1) that the defendants sanctioned Karen’s refusal to teach Misha, (2) that the defendants failed to provide Misha with a new contract teacher in the Bell Springs area, and (3) that the defendants conspired to make the provision of public school services, for which they were responsible, contingent upon the approval of a private group.

As regards the first allegation, the evidence is undisputed that Lynn was assigned to be Misha’s contract instructor, after Karen decided not to continue as Misha’s teacher, and Misha remained in the contract teaching program until she was placed on a waiting list for a contract teacher, along with other students in September, 1991. There is no evidentiary basis for finding that Misha, who was assigned a contract teacher after Karen decided not to continue as Misha’s teacher, was deprived of equal educational opportunities by defendants Richard M and Brian B.

The plaintiffs also assert that the defendants failed to provide Misha with a new contract teacher in the Bell Springs area. The plaintiffs emphasize the difficulties encountered by Misha in traveling to Laytonville to meet with her contract instructor. Nevertheless, the evidence is undisputed that the school district’s policy was to permit contract teachers to decide jointly, where meetings would take place.

The plaintiffs have presented no evidence that the school district’s policy of permitting the student and teacher to determine a meeting place was applied with respect to Misha in a disparate or arbitrary fashion. Misha’s classmates may have met with their contract instructors at locations closer to the students’ homes; however, the locations of meetings were determined jointly by students and contract teachers. The plaintiffs have presented no evidence to the contrary. The plaintiffs’ argument is rejected therefore as without merit.

Finally the plaintiffs allege that the defendants conspired to make the provision of public school services for which they were responsible, contingent upon the approval of a private group. The plaintiffs’ argument is foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit’s earlier ruling in this matter. The plaintiffs are precluded from seeking relief for the deprivation of private, as opposed to public, educational opportunities. As such, the court grants summary judgment on the equal protection claim in favor of defendants Richard M and Brian B.” 

Linda T-J entered the legal battle, because she was the superintendent who followed Mark I, and had to address the Chintz matter.   

“The plaintiffs allege that in October and November, 1994, Superintendent Linda T-J refused to meet with Corrine to discuss Misha’s return to the school district. The plaintiffs do not offer any admissible evidence in support of this allegation. The cited deposition testimony of Corrine is conclusory and lacks foundation. Misha’s testimony constitutes hearsay, and is inadmissible:

Question: You were not present at that meeting?

Misha: Not that I remember.

Question: Did your mother tell you what happened?

Misha: Yes.

Question:  And what did she tell you?

Misha: She said that Linda T-J had--I don’t remember if she met with Linda or if Linda just told Sally.  I think it was that Linda had told Sally that they weren’t allowed to talk to us because we were in litigation, there was a lawsuit.

In contrast, the defendants submit as evidence Linda T-J’s sworn statement that “neither she, nor her staff to her knowledge ever advised Ms. Chintz that Misha could not be re-enrolled in the School District because of her ongoing lawsuit against various School District related defendants.  The plaintiffs cannot defeat defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.

The Court therefore grants summary judgment on the equal protection claim, in favor of each of the defendants and against the plaintiffs.

Eight years to the day after my courtroom experience began, it finally came to a conclusion.  I don’t even remember thinking about the five million ($) reasons for being glad it was over, so much as thinking I was glad I no longer had to drive down to Ukiah, to spend a day in the corridors of Ukiah’s Superior Court, or consulting with Barry Vogel, on a point of clarification, as he maneuvered those corridors in our stead.  It cost a lot of money to watch him walk those corridors, but I paid him with a smile.  

When that didn’t work, I paid him cash.

Bring in the Cavalry

This is Episode 19 in the story of the formation, rise and fall of the little education collective that used to exist up here on our mountain. I wrote and posted this account three years ago on my blog and then pulled it off because someone whose name I had not changed, objected. Now I have changed both the name of the little school itself, and the names of everyone who might be negatively impacted, and plan to re-post the story, one episode per day, until all 32 are again on my blog.

Bring in the Cavalry

In attempting to sift through the details of Imika’s Civil Rights Violations Complaint, I am recording the seven causes of action that she listed in her lawsuit, filed up in Eureka at the Law Offices of Bernard C. DePaoli in 1992. The first cause of action appeared at the end of Episode # 18, On the Hook and detailed Imika’ belief that by excluding Misha from Bell Springs Collective, the members had acted to deprive her and Misha of their First Amendment rights.

The second cause of action, like the first, would have made for entertaining fiction, except that it was levied at us. I am transcribing it as it appears in court documents:

Paragraphs 1-47 are incorporated herein by reference and made paragraph 48. 

48) By the actions described above defendants, and each of them, deprived the plaintiffs of their following clearly established and well-settled Constitutional rights.

Freedom from deprivation of liberty without due process of law.

Freedom from interference of the First Amendment right to free speech.  

Freedom of association.   

Freedom from unequal enforcement of the law and unequal protection of the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Freedom from violations of Constitutional rights as guaranteed by 42 United States Code Section 1982 which states that, ‘All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every state and territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. 

Freedom from violations of Constitutional rights as guaranteed by 42 United States Code Section 1981 which states that, “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right, in every state and territory, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind and to no other. 

Freedom from discrimination under both state and federal laws, including the California Educational Code.

The third cause of action is as follows:

By the actions described above defendants and each of them described herein, slandered plaintiff Corrine Chintz, giving rise to a separate state cause of action over which this court has pendent jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs, and each of them, have subjected plaintiff Corrine Chintz to these deprivations of her rights, either maliciously, or by acting with reckless disregard for whether plaintiff Corrine Chintz’s rights would be violated by these actions.

As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of defendants. and each of them, the plaintiff Corrine Chintz was forced to endure great pain and mental suffering, was deprived of her physical liberty, her right to freedom of association, her right to freedom of speech, her right to equal protection under the laws, and was forced to endure great legal and medical expense.

The fourth cause of action is as follows:

By the actions described above defendants and each of them described herein, slandered plaintiff Misha Chintz, giving rise to a separate state cause of action over which this court has pendent jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs, and each of them, have subjected plaintiff Misha Chintz to these deprivations of her rights, either maliciously, or by acting with reckless disregard for whether plaintiff Misha Chintz’s rights would be violated by these actions.

As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of defendants. and each of them, the plaintiff Misha Chintz was forced to endure great pain and mental suffering, was deprived of her physical liberty, her right to freedom of association, her right to freedom of speech, her right to equal protection under the laws, and was forced to endure great legal and medical expense.

The fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action, appeared to duplicate portions of the third and fourth causes, so I did not transcribe them.

I have listed the charges, and I have given the background leading up to this point.  What I haven’t told you was what Imika was seeking.  Could she put a price tag on all of this pain and suffering? This is how it appeared on her complaint:

Wherefore, plaintiffs Corrine Chintz and Misha Chintz request the court: 

Award compensatory damages against the defendants, jointly and severely, in the amount of five million dollars ($5,000,000.00)

Award costs of this action including attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs.

Award such other and further relief as the court may deem appropriate including the issuance of a permanent injunction preventing the Laytonville Unified School District and its respective agents, employees and servants, from discriminating against, harassing, annoying, or otherwise interfering with each of the respective plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights: and

Award such other and further relief as this court may deem proper and appropriate.

Some people called her crazy; indeed, Barry Vogel considered her “fundamentally nuts.”  Even if she was not playing with a full deck, she was sure going to make the pot worth winning. If she had been asking for fifty thousand dollars, or even double that, we might have been able to slough it aside, figuring that with all of the defendants, and the district, there was little danger of monetary consequences.  However, five million, while laughable under one magnifying glass, became terrifying under another.

Hiring Barry was the only logical thing to do even though it was going to be expensive.  At least when Barry got through with us, we would still have our homes. With a cool five million dollars out there on the table, we figured that covered a lot of real estate. Barry had told us from the beginning that it was anybody’s right to sue, and that one had to defend oneself against a lawsuit, but this was ridiculous.  Imika’s claims would never stand up in court. Nevertheless, to ignore her lawsuit, was to admit, in court, that she was correct. Bring in the cavalry. 

Barry?

On the Hook

This is Episode 18 in the story of the formation, rise and fall of the little education collective that used to exist up here on our mountain. I wrote and posted this account three years ago on my blog and then pulled it off because someone whose name I had not changed, objected. Now I have changed both the name of the little school itself, and the names of everyone who might be negatively impacted, and plan to re-post the story, one episode per day, until all 32 are again on my blog.

On the Hook

People use the U.S. Court System for a multitude of purposes, not all of them designed to produce justice. I have no idea how valid Imika considered her complaint, but the members of the Collective thought it was nothing more than anger and petulance on her part. Judge Susan Illston agreed with us. Her judgment for the defendants was clear and concise, as she summed up the arguments and presented judgment. I am not going to transcribe the entire document, but I am going to present the rationale behind her decision.

Judge Illston began by summarizing the factual allegations. She wrote:

“This matter involves the independent study/contract teaching program offered since the early 1980’s by Laytonville Unified as an option to residents of the school district.  Under this optional independent study/home education program, contract teachers are assigned to meet with students and supervise their independent study one hour per week.  Misha Chintz was assigned a number of contract teachers spanning the period from 1986 through Fall of 1991.

During the period Misha was enrolled in the optional independent study/contract teaching program, she also received educational services through the Bell Springs Education Collective, a private teaching collective started by parents living in the Bell Springs/Cow Mountain area.  Parents belonging to the collective received instruction, training, and supervision from the school district’s contract instructors, which enabled the parents to act as tutors for the children enrolled in the collective.  No legal relationship existed between the school district’s contract teaching program and the Collective’s educational program, although several contract teachers met with their assigned students at the Bell Springs Community Center until April, 1990, when the Laytonville Unified School Board voted to end this practice.

In the fall of 1988, Misha began her second grade year with defendant Karen as her contract teacher.  For approximately two to three weeks, Misha also received educational services through Bell Springs.  Substantial problems developed between Imika and the Bell Springs Collective soon after Misha began second grade.  In order to reach the Bell Springs Community Center, which was located near the plaintiffs’ house, Bell Springs members used an easement over the plaintiffs’ property.  Ms. Chintz complained vehemently about the use of the easement and the increased traffic on the road near her property.  Ms. Chintz eventually filed suit against Joe, the owner of the property on which the Community Center was located, and Bell Springs, to enjoin the use of the easement.  

On September 17, 1988, Ms. Chintz received a memorandum from the Collective, informing her that her access to the Bell Springs building was henceforth restricted.  On September 23, 1988, defendant Karen, Misha’s second grade contract teacher, informed the Chintzes that she could no longer continue as Misha’s contract teacher.  In her letter to the Chintzes Karen stated that Misha was not progressing adequately academically, that Misha was not completing her homework, that Misha was not getting enough direction and assistance from her mother at home, that calm communication with Ms. Chintz was nearly impossible, and that Misha would benefit from a mainstream school program.  Karen encouraged Ms. Chintz to talk with Richard M, Principal of Laytonville Elementary School, about her options. 

Misha was assigned a different contract instructor, Lynn for the remainder of her second grade school year up through the fall of 1989, the beginning of Misha’s fourth grade school year.  During the summer of 1990, Ms. Chintz subpoenaed Lynn to testify in a lawsuit brought by Ms. Chintz against defendant O’Neill.  Ms Chintz was dissatisfied with Lynn’s testimony and thereafter requested a new contract instructor for Misha.  

Liz was subsequently assigned to replace Lynn as Misha’s contract teacher.  In the Fall of 1991, Ms. Chintz contacted Interim Superintendent Mark I regarding the limited amount of attention that Misha was receiving from Liz.  Defendant I agreed that Liz was stretched too thin to provide adequate educational plans for all of her students, and he subsequently restricted Liz to teaching high school students, leaving Misha without a contract instructor.  

Because the independent study program was understaffed, the plaintiffs were informed that no contract teachers were available to instruct Misha.  Mark I advised the plaintiffs that Misha’s name would be placed on a waiting list with other student for the next available contract instructor.  Disregarding Superintendent Mark’s recommendation that Misha attend the mainstream school program until a contract teacher became available, Ms. Chintz transferred Misha to Mendocino Unified School District...”

On July 27, 1992, the plaintiffs (Imika and Misha) filed a complaint against the school district, officials and employees of the school district, and several private individuals associated with Bell Springs School, alleging violations of federal and state law.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted with leave to amend on December 9, 1992.

On February 3, 1993, the plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, dismissing Laytonville unified as a defendant.  The defendants again moved to dismiss the Complaint, and the Court granted the defendants’ second motion to dismiss, without leave to amend on April 27, 1993.

The plaintiffs appealed the Order of Dismissal to the ninth circuit, which upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against the private individual defendants but reversed and remanded as to the claims against the school district defendants.

On October 19, 1995, the plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 and by the following defendants: all defendants who were connected to the LUSD.

On February 13, 1996, this Court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ remaining 1983 claim.

In its discussion, the Court began by presenting both sides’ principle argument.  The defendants assert that there exist no genuine issues of material fact and that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on plaintiffs’ equal protection and free speech claim.  The plaintiffs assert in turn that there is evidence to demonstrate that Misha was denied educational opportunities in retaliation for Ms. Chintz’s statements and conduct toward the defendants.

Judge Susan Illston began by stating that the plaintiffs make two specific allegations with respect to defendant Karen: (1) that Karen refused to continue teaching Misha after Imika’s objections to the Collective’s use of the road near her home intensified and (2) that Karen, as a member of the Collective’s Administrative Committee, helped determine that Imika and Misha should be expelled from the Collective and Bell Springs activities. 

According to the plaintiffs, Karen excluded Misha from the contract teaching program in retaliation for Imika’s complaints.  The plaintiffs submit as evidence a letter they received from Karen in which Karen states:

I have informed Mr. M, Principal of Laytonville Elementary School, that Misha will not be involved in this contract program.

However, there is no evidence that Misha was actually excluded from the contract teaching program by Karen.  To the contrary, the evidence is undisputed that Lynn was assigned as Misha’s contract teacher after Karen determined that she could no longer continue as Misha’s instructor and that Misha remained in the contract teaching program until September, 1991.  The evidence clearly indicates that Misha was not deprived by Karen of public educational opportunities. The plaintiffs also contend that Karen excluded Misha from Bell Sprigs activities.  However, the evidence is undisputed that the Bell Springs program is privately run.  In an earlier ruling on this matter, the Ninth Circuit Court held that:

“Because Bell Springs Education Cooperative was privately run school, and those who worked there were private citizens, the Chintzes have not alleged any ‘state action’ on their part sufficient to state a claim against them in federal court.”

As such, even if Karen helped exclude Misha from the Bell Springs program, Karen did not deprive Misha of a public educational opportunity.

Karen was off the hook; now it was my turn. Anyone need a Christmas Tree ornament? I’m dangling.

Fundamentally Nuts

This is Episode 17 in the story of the formation, rise and fall of the little education collective that used to exist up here on our mountain. I wrote and posted this account three years ago on my blog and then pulled it off because someone whose name I had not changed, objected. Now I have changed both the name of the little school itself, and the names of everyone who might be negatively impacted, and plan to re-post the story, one episode per day, until all 32 are again on my blog.

Fundamentally Nuts

The questions we asked Barry Vogel, prior to the court trial involving Imika’s claim that her First Amendment Rights had been violated by Bell Springs Collective, reflected both our concern for the gravity of the situation, and our desire to have each member’s needs addressed appropriately. 

By the time this legal development in Federal Court was unfolding the first time in 1992, the families in the collective had moved on, putting the children into the school system down in Laytonville.  Many of us had managed to put Imika behind us, especially after she enrolled Misha in the Mendocino Unified School District, thereby distancing her that much more.

Having gathered together at Will’s house, the designated liaison between the group and Barry, we brainstormed questions for which he provided answers:

• In our phone conversation you discuss the issue of professional counseling. What does this mean?

“Chintz stated that she sought and received professional counseling with Dr. Huff, a psychiatrist. She alleges this was necessary because of certain things she claims you and the school district did to her. I believe that she has needed psychiatric counseling for a long time. If she continues to allege that you are the sole cause for this need, we will have her examined by a psychiatrist of our choosing. This will be done in an attempt to prove that she is fundamentally nuts, and that whatever you may have done, if in fact you did anything at all, had absolutely no relationship to her emotional disturbance.”

• Can someone sign the waiver to have you represent them and drop out at a later date?

“The waiver that I want each of you to sign essentially is an acknowledgement that you know I am representing multiple defendants in the same lawsuit...An attorney-client relationship can be terminated at any time at the sole discretion of the client. With certain limitations on notice, and an opportunity to get other counsel, the attorney may also terminate the relationship. Anyone can drop out at a later date.”

• What is the probable timetable for this court action?  

“The short run timetable is for me to get a unilateral extension of the 20 days in answer from the court. The complaint is complicated and interwoven with her earlier state court cases.  After that, the following time table is set out in the material that should have been served on each of you set out in General Order No. 34, in the group of papers called Notice and Acknowledgement of Receipt of Summons and Complaint.”

• Once we respond, what is the next step?

“The next step after the response depends on what our response is. It may well be a motion to dismiss at least part of the complaint. If not, it will be a court controlled conference to identify the issues to be tried.  The court will also set a schedule for discovery and trial. Discovery means each side has the opportunity to interview and collect facts about the case f the other side.”

• If something in the complaint is totally wrong, like the dates, is that grounds for dismissal?

“Statute of limitations affect wrong dates. Since Chintz filed a verified complaint...she has sworn that all the facts stated in the complaint are true. It is difficult to later come around and give other information.  I will need to have each of you go over the complaint to identify the incorrect facts and dates. I want you to give me the information you have, to show the facts are wrong and the ones you propose are correct.”

• If you are identified, but no specific allegations are made against you, can you still be tried?

“I see this as a problem for Chintz. She has named many of you, but did not state that you did any specific act against her. She does say early on that each of you are the agent and employee of the other. That allegation is generally not sufficient to keep a person in the case. The specifics will be determined when I take her deposition. If there are no specifics, the chances then are very good that those persons can be dismissed from the case.”

• Point: Judge Orr is seeing if he can get Chintz on the list of vexatious litigants. Will this be of any help?

“I believe that she has crossed over the line and is now a vexatious litigant.  Further research needs to be done on this. We will discuss it when we meet on Friday.”

There was so much to discuss. The overwhelming nature of the claims were enough without having to think about defending ourselves in court.  There were eight causes of action in Chintz’s complaint.  The first was a detailed history of the Wellspring Collective, from its inception through its demise, the intent being to establish its existence and then to claim that by excluding her, we had deprived her daughter of her constitutional rights.  

The complaint spared no detail, as it chronicled the development of the preschool, the one-room school house, the road issue, and the acrimonious relationship that had existed during the late eighties. In naming the school district and members of the school board, and maintaining that they had been involved in the formation of Bell Springs was the height of ridiculous, and it seemed that that error in her complaint might cost her the ballgame.

One of her concluding arguments had been that as a unit, we of Bell Springs had met together after the school was red-tagged and closed, to investigate the rekindling of the school on another site. We did not invite the Chintzes to participate in these planning meetings, and thus denied Imika her right to contribute to these meetings.

Another of her contentions contained within this first cause of action (which went from Civil Rights Complaint Page 7 to Civil Rights Complaint Page 19) was that I had endangered Misha’s life with my reckless driving, and that acts of vandalism had been committed on her property.

We remained flummoxed that this was all really happening, and there were still seven causes of action to sift through.

Pay to Play

This is Episode16 in the story of the formation, rise and fall of the little education collective that used to exist up here on our mountain. I wrote and posted this account three years ago on my blog and then pulled it off because someone whose name I had not changed, objected. Now I have changed both name of the little school itself, and the names of everyone who might be negatively impacted, and plan to re-post the story, one episode per day, until all 32 are again on my blog.

Pay to Play

As unfair as the whole sordid affair was, it was our sordid affair and no one else was going to fight it for us. Bart’s profoundly extreme suggestion was too bizarre for words, but the reality is that bizarre acts of uncivilized retribution are a dime a dozen in our culture, so it wasn’t as though Bart was wasn’t thinking that which had been thought before. Just not by us.

So when we met with Barry Vogel, it wasn’t to expect charity because downtown Ukiah, coincidentally in the same locale as the courthouse, was was a hotbed of lawyers’ offices and any one of them could have handled the Corrine Chintz matter with one hand tied behind his or her back. The thing about Barry was, we liked him and we thought he had a certain amount of sympathy for us. How much that would impact the rate at which he worked was impossible to determine.

This is what Barry explained to us: “I plan to charge 150 dollars per hour.  That is for time spent on the project, which means research time, preparing court papers, court time, travel time (unless I can coordinate with another case, and then that cost is split), phone time, meeting with clients time, etc.” [If it remotely sounds expensive, imagine what we thought in the nineties.]

“I would like to receive a retainer of $7,500 to apply to the work I have done and will do until the amount is used up. I can send monthly statements.  When we are down to $1,000 left I will request another amount as an additional retainer. The $150 per hour contemplates representing a group of you. That is not a per person charge.”

We knew we were in the big leagues now. We all had questions, and a lot of them were shared concerns. Here are some of those questions and answers that we brainstormed at Will’s house, the night we met as a group to discus strategy:

* Why can certain members of Bell Springs Collective be identified and not everyone? Why not all school board members?

“Chintz can determine who to sue. It is her choice to decide that.  She may feel that only the persons who are named are responsible. The defendants (the people sued) could decide to counter sue for indemnity against the people who were or are part of Bell Springs or the school board and were not named by her.”

* How feasible is it for some of us to represent ourselves?

“It is difficult to represent yourself. Federal Court is more formal and less forgiving than Mendocino County Superior Court.  Since none of you are lawyers, you could only represent yourself as an individual. No one can represent someone else unless you are a lawyer. That means you would all have to stand up and speak for yourselves and submit your own written documents. The documents required are peculiar in nature, and require certain forms.”

* If we do sue her for malicious prosecution and win, would her land be protected?  What kind of damages might be awarded?

“You can sue her for malicious prosecution after there is a final judgment in your favor in this case. Her land may be protected under the homestead exemption laws up to a value of either $75,000 or $100,000 depending on the category into which she falls. The damages that might be awarded are generally in relation to the economic hardship it causes you, and the extent she was determined to be malicious. The dollar amount is a guess at this time.”

* Under what conditions can attorneys’ fees and court costs be awarded?

“I am not aware of how attorneys’ fees could be awarded to you at this time. That is something that I will have to research. I am not hopeful on this issue. Court costs, which mean filing fees, deposition fees, etc. are generally awarded to the winner at the end of the case.”

* In the event we lose, how would the court determine who pays what?

“If you lose, the court has several options to determine who pays what.  Realistically, if there is judgment I would push that it be paid by the Laytonville School District insurance. None of it should be paid by any of you. Joint and several liability means that the winner can get money from whoever has it, up to the full amount of the judgment. Individual liability means that each person who has been determined to be liable would be adjudged to owe a specific amount. The judge usually makes the decisions on who is obligated to pay what.”

* Does it matter if you signed anything when served?  Several people did not.

“I don’t think it matters if you signed anything when you were served.  Proof of service is filled out by the person who serves you. If some of you did sign something, I would like to know what it is.”

I would have signed anything, if it meant getting out of this legal entanglement, but that seemed unlikely, as long as Imika was determined to follow though on her threat to close the school.